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Accurately assessing current and future technological capabilities can provide 
organizations with competitive advantage. However, do accurate assessments become 
more difficult when technology progresses at a rapid rate? This dissertation examines the 
rapid growth of artificial intelligence (AI), its impact on organizations, and the human 
biases that impede accurate assessments of rapid technological progress. Given the 
magnitude with which AI is impacting organizations, the importance of accurately 
assessing technological capabilities is hard to overstate. However, I argue that due to the 
exponential growth bias (i.e., the tendency to underestimate exponential growth), people 
underestimate both how quickly AI has advanced and is likely to advance. Moreover, due 
to the motivated reasoning bias (i.e., the desire to search for and interpret information in 
ways consistent with one’s desires), I predict people will reject the aversive implications of 
rapid technological progress, further impeding accurate assessment. I examine these 
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An accurate assessment of current and future technological capabilities can 
provide organizations with competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). However, managers 
who are unaware of current technological capabilities will be hard-pressed to adopt new 
technology in a timely fashion, let alone benefit from it (Porter & Millar, 1985). 
Moreover, when adoption of technology requires significant lead time (e.g., in the case of 
technologies requiring new laws or infrastructure to be in place before adoption), an 
accurate prediction of technological capabilities can become even more important due to 
the first mover advantage (Liebermann & Montgomery, 1988) enjoyed by those who 
exploit technological capabilities.  
When technology progresses nonlinearly (e.g., at a continual, exponential, 
positive rate), an accurate assessment of technological capabilities is challenging for two 
reasons. First, people consistently underestimate how quickly exponential growth curves 
accelerate (Stango & Zinman, 2009a; Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975), a tendency that is 
called the exponential growth bias. The central finding regarding the exponential growth 
bias is that people persistently and substantially underestimate exponential growth 
(Stango & Zinman, 2009b). 
Second, exponential progress in technology may result in aversive outcomes (e.g., 
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mass unemployment, reduced autonomy, or existential risks; Bostrom, 2014; Ford, 2015; 
Frey & Osborne, 2017), further impeding an accurate assessment of technological 
progress. Research in social psychology indicates that conclusions that violate people’s 
desired preferences (e.g., aversive outcomes) will tend to be discounted (Buehler, Griffin, 
& MacDonald, 1997; Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Paharia, Vohs, & Deshpandé, 2013). This 
tendency for people to arrive at conclusions they prefer, as opposed to conclusions that 
are accurate (Dawson, Gilovich, & Regan, 2002; Kunda, 1990; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 
1999) is termed the motivated reasoning bias (Kunda, 1990). In numerous domains, 
individuals’ predictions of what will happen coincide with what they would like to see 
happen (Johnson & Sherman, 1990; Kunda, 1990; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Although 
people are motivated to make accurate assessments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), people are 
also motivated to arrive at conclusions they prefer (Kunda, 1987, 1990). 
This dissertation argues that due to the exponential growth bias (Stango & 
Zinman, 2009b), people are unaware of, and unprepared for, upcoming changes to 
organizations stemming from rapid technological progress. Moreover, due to the 
motivated reasoning bias (Kunda, 1990), people are prone to reject the aversive 
implications of rapid progress. Thus, I predict people will inaccurately assess current and 
future technological progress when technological progress is rapid. 
To test these predictions, I examine the exponential progress of technology. I 
explore how technology is changing and will likely change organizations in the future. I 
argue that people are unaware of, and unprepared for, these changes due to the 
exponential growth bias. I then discuss some of the potential aversive implications of 
exponential technological progress (e.g., mass unemployment, computers surpassing 
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human capabilities, computers posing existential risks to humans) and argue that, due to 
the motivated reasoning bias, people reject aversive implications of rapid technological 





A simple thought experiment illustrates how quickly technology is advancing, and 
thus how quickly organizations are both changing and are expected to change in the 
coming decades. Imagine a person living in the 1700s, who travels primarily by foot and 
lives in a home heated by fire (Derry & Williams, 1993). Now imagine that person 
traveling back in time 3,000 years. Presumably, she would not be surprised to be 
traveling primarily by foot and living in a home heated by fire. Now imagine that same 
person, who lives in the 1700s. What if she were to travel just 300 years into the future 
(as opposed to 3,000)? Presumably she would be surprised by the running water, heating 
and air-conditioning systems, flushing toilets, electrical outlets, radios, telephones, 
televisions, computers, the Internet, satellites, interstate highways, self-driving cars, jet 
airplanes, commercial farms, grocery stores, and skyscrapers.  
Why the drastic change in technology? The simple explanation is that technology 
has progressed at an exponential rate (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Kurzweil, 2005). 
For thousands of years, humans correctly expected their future to be much like their past. 
Exponential growth trends existed, but the progress was so slow as to be imperceptible 
within one’s lifetime or even across many generations. That is the nature of exponential 
growth—it starts out relatively slow before accelerating upward rapidly (McKenzie & 
Liersch, 2011; Stango & Zinman, 2009a).  
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Exponential growth can lead to outcomes that are difficult to anticipate or 
appreciate given that humans tend to underestimate exponential growth curves (de 
Langhe, Puntoni, & Larrick, 2017). To illustrate the limits of intuition when it comes to 
exponential growth, imagine a disease that spreads by a factor of two, each day. For 
example, on day one, one person is infected; on day two, two people are infected; on day 
three, four people are infected. How many days would it take for the disease to spread to 
7.5 billion people? The calculations are simple, yet intuitions are often wrong (McKenzie 
& Liersch, 2011; Stango & Zinman, 2009a). After 27 days, less than 1% of the 
population would be infected. But just seven days later, the disease would spread 128-
fold; every person on earth would be infected.  
The tendency to underestimate the growth of exponential curves is called the 
exponential growth bias (Soll, Keeney, & Larrick, 2013; Stango & Zinman, 2009a). The 
origins of research on the exponential growth bias can be traced to Wagenaar and Sagaria 
(1975) and Wagenaar and Timmers (1978, 1979). Their central finding is that people 
persistently and substantially underestimate exponential growth (Stango & Zinman, 
2009b). The bias is robust to different contexts, such as forecasting pollution (Wagenaar 
& Sagaria, 1975) or forecasting retirement savings growth (McKenzie & Liersch, 2011), 
and is also robust to different presentations, such as when information is presented in 
tables and graphs (Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975) or when information is presented in the 
form of a story problem (McKenzie & Liersch, 2011).  
The exponential growth bias, while often examined in instances of financial 
returns (Hubbard, Matthews, & Samek, 2016; McKenzie & Liersch, 2011), is especially 
relevant to technological progress. A clear demonstration of exponential growth in 
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technology is in the field of computing. In 1965, Gordon Moore—who later became the 
chairman of Intel—noticed that computing capability doubled every two years, while 
costs simultaneously decreased (Schaller, 1997; Waldrop, 2016). This resulted in an 
exponential growth in the price-performance of computation (performance increased 
exponentially as price decreased). For example, in 1968, one dollar could purchase one 
transistor (a fundamental building block of computing capability), whereas in 2002, one 
dollar could purchase 10 million transistors; moreover, transistors in 2002 were nearly 
1000 times faster than transistors in 1968 (Kurzweil, 2005). In 2017, Intel announced that 
it could fit more than 100 million transistors in each square millimeter of their chips 
(Courtland, 2017). In sum, “the critical building blocks of computing: microchip density, 
processing speed, storage capacity, energy efficiency, download speed, and so on, have 
been improving exponentially…” (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014, p. 49). 
What does this sort of exponential improvement mean for technology products? 
The Apple iPhone is one such product—it has more computing power than all of NASA’s 
computers combined that helped send humans to the moon (Kaku, 2012; Rosoff, 2014).  
Other real-world examples illustrate the effects of exponential growth in 
technology. In 1990, biochemists set the goal to transcribe the human genome in 15 
years; yet, these same scientists had spent the prior year transcribing just one ten-
thousandth of the human genome (Venter et al., 2001). At the then-current technological 
rates, the project would have taken thousands of years to complete; however, due to 
exponential growth in computing speed (which the scientists accurately predicted), the 
human genome was decoded just 13 years later (Venter et al., 2001).  
One area of technology that is especially benefitting from the exponential 
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progress in computing speed is artificial intelligence (AI; computer systems that are able 
to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence; Russel & Norvig, 2010). 
Given that computing capability is the backbone of AI (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014), 
AIs are expected to improve rapidly, as computers continue to improve. In the following 
section, I examine recent progress in AI to demonstrate how quickly AIs have progressed 
in the last several years. I then examine how AIs are changing, and will change, 
organizations. 
Note, when discussing tasks that AIs complete, I use phrases such as identifying 
cancer, driving cars, translating languages, etc. I recognize that AIs do not complete 
these tasks using the same cognitive processing that humans use. However, for the 
purposes of this research, I am generally concerned with the outputs of AIs as opposed to 




A 2013 book on judgment and decision making opens with the following 
sentence: “With little effort, we can accomplish sophisticated tasks, such as recognizing 
faces or catching a ball, that are far beyond the abilities of even the most powerful 
computers and sophisticated robots” (Bazerman & Moore, 2013, p.1).  
Four years later, the gap between humans and computers has narrowed 
drastically, as progress on AI “has completely exploded,” (Standage, 2016, p. 2). AIs are 
identifying cancer (Rose, 2016), driving cars (Levandowski, 2016), trading stocks (Peltz, 
2017), translating languages (Marshall, 2017), producing music (Goldhill, 2016), 
scanning legal contracts (Rosenbaum, 2016), producing news articles (Oremus, 2016), 
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and beating humans in games (Ferrucci, Levas, Bagchi, Gondek, & Mueller, 2013; Silver 
et al., 2016). For example, in 2011, IBM’s Watson beat two of Jeopardy’s greatest 
champions in a multiday event (Ferrucci et al., 2013). Watson was programmed to 
download all of Wikipedia, and was then able to respond to the similes, jokes, and riddles 
it encountered on Jeopardy! (e.g., when Watson received the following clue in the rhyme 
category, “a long tiresome speech delivered by a frothy pie topping,” Watson correctly 
responded “A meringue harangue”; Cadwalladr, 2014, para. 25). 
In 2015, an AI bested humans in an image recognition challenge (Standage, 
2016), and in 2016, Google’s DeepMind defeated one of the world’s best Go players 
(Standage, 2016). Google recently announced that their computer can speak nearly as 
well as a human (van den Oord, Zen, & Dieleman, 2016) and Uber announced that “self-
driving” Ubers are available in Pittsburgh (Levandowski, 2016). AIs are also helping 
companies save energy; Google announced that its AI had achieved a 40% reduction in 
the amount of energy used for cooling their data centers (Evans & Gao, 2016), a 
significant feat given the level of sophistication that computer-aided humans had already 
put in place before the AI produced its solution. 
In 2017, the AI Libratus beat four professional poker players in a 20-day 
tournament. AIs had previously won games in which each player had a full view of a 
game board (e.g., chess, checkers, go). In poker, however, the AI cannot know what cards 
the opponent has been dealt nor what decisions the opponent will likely make as a result. 
In this way, poker more closely mirrors the decisions people face every day (Overly, 
2017). To compensate for these uncertainties, a meta-algorithm analyzed the weaknesses 
in Libratus’ strategy at the end of each day, and then algorithmically improved on the 
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weaknesses each night (McLean, 2017). At the end of the tournament, Libratus had won 
$1,766,250 in hypothetical money, whereas each of the four professionals finished in the 
negative. 
AIs have progressed rapidly and are expected by many to continue to do so 
(Dobbs et al., 2015). According to some estimates, the “AI avalanche” (i.e., the rapid 
progress and widespread adoption of AI) will happen faster, and at a broader scale, than 
the industrial revolution, thus having an even greater impact on humanity (Dobbs et al., 
2015; Kurzweil, 2005).  
The current wave of AI progress is driven in large part by improved, “deep 
learning” algorithms (Chou et al., 2017; Jordan & Mitchell, 2015; Standage, 2016). 
Traditionally, programmers wrote specific instructions for computers to execute, and the 
computers could only execute those specific instructions (Goodfellow, Bengio, & 
Courville, 2016; LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015). For example, if a programmer wanted 
a computer program to correctly classify an image of a chair, the programmer had to 
write a list of rules for the program to follow to correctly identify a chair (e.g., does the 
focal image have four legs, a place to sit, etc.). However, deep learning algorithms rely 
on vast amounts of data, rather than a comprehensive list of rules, to identify patterns. For 
example, if a programmer wanted a deep learning algorithm to correctly classify an 
image of a chair, the programmer would feed the algorithm millions of images of chairs, 
and let the algorithm determine the patterns that distinguish chairs from other objects 
(LeCun et al., 2015). Thus, as the deep learning algorithm analyzes more and more data, 
it improves its capabilities (Goodfellow et al., 2016; Hof, 2013). These improved deep 
learning algorithms, in conjunction with more powerful computing capabilities, are in 
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large part responsible for the surge in AI capabilities and applications (Chou et al., 2017).   
 
 
How Is AI Changing Organizations?  
 Examining the impact that AI is already having on several industries illustrates 
how consequential AI has become, and foreshadows how consequential AI may soon 
become. In the following section, I examine several industries—health care, 
transportation, education, arts and entertainment, retail, finance, and law—that are 
already changing due to AI advancements.  
Health care. Artificial intelligence is changing the way doctors diagnose disease. 
The University of North Carolina’s Lineberger Comprehensive Cancer Center (LCCC) is 
using IBM’s Watson—the same computer system that beat two Jeopardy! champions—to 
diagnose cancer (Rose, 2016). Although scientific research grows at a rate too fast for 
doctors to consume (some 8,000 academic papers per day), the rate does not surpass a 
properly resourced AIs’ ability (Rose, 2016). The LCCC fed Watson 25 million 
published medical papers in about one week; Watson also scanned the Web for the latest 
scientific research. The LCCC then had Watson analyze data from 1,000 cancer patients. 
In 99% of the cases, Watson identified the same treatments that doctors identified. 
“The…more exciting part about [the analysis] is in 30% of patients, Watson found 
something new—so that’s 300-plus people where Watson identified [an additional] 
treatment that a well-meaning, hard-working group of physicians hadn’t found” (Rose, 
2016, interview on 60 Minutes).  
Other AIs are having success in health care as well. Google researchers are using 
an eye-scanning AI to detect diabetic retinopathy, which affects almost 1/3 of diabetes 
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patients, and the AI is performing as well as highly trained ophthalmologists (Knight, 
2016). AIs are also successfully diagnosing congenital cataracts (Long et al., 2017; 
Panko, 2017) that when caught early and treated (as they often are in the US) typically do 
not pose a problem. In the developing world, however, early detection is not common 
(e.g., in China, roughly 30% of childhood blindness is due to this form of the disease; 
Panko, 2017). Although human doctors are limited in the number of patients they can see 
each year, AI systems downloaded as an app on a phone will not have the same 
limitations.  
Bernard Tyson, the CEO of Kaiser Permanente recently stated, “I don’t think any 
physician today should be practicing without artificial intelligence assisting in their 
practice. It’s just impossible (otherwise) to pick up on patterns, to pick up on trends, to 
really monitor care” (Moukheiber, 2014, para. 6). AIs are also being deployed by 
pharmaceutical companies to speed up drug discoveries (Schubarth, 2017). Moreover, 
robots that continually improve in dexterity are expected to take on an even larger role in 
surgeries (Robotics-VO, 2013). 
Not only is AI changing the way doctors diagnose disease, AI is also changing the 
way patients interact with doctors. Veterans in California are participating in virtual 
psychotherapy sessions, in which they discuss their symptoms with an animated AI 
avatar on a computer screen (DeVault et al., 2014). According to researchers of the 
DARPA-sponsored project, participants report overall satisfaction when interacting with 
the avatar and feel as much rapport with the AI avatar as they feel with face-to-face 
interviews. Moreover, participants often extend their therapy sessions by double the 
allotted time (Garber, 2014).  
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Transportation. In 2015, nearly 40,000 people were killed on American 
roadways, and another 4.4 million suffered injuries requiring medical attention (National 
Safety Council, 2016). Worldwide, there are 1.24 million traffic fatalities every year, and 
90% of all accidents are due to driver error (Waldrop, 2015). AIs are expected to 
revolutionize the transportation industry, saving millions of lives in the process. Self-
driving cars are already on the roadways in Pittsburgh (Levandowski, 2016) and 
Washington D.C. (Muoio, 2016), and Google’s self-driving car has driven more than 2 
million miles. Although it had been in 14 collisions as of 2016, 13 of those accidents 
were caused by the person driving the other car (Bhuiyan, 2016). Just how soon AIs can 
drive and fly better than humans, and how quickly humans are willing to adopt self-
driving cars and planes, has life and death consequences. “A pilotless airliner is going to 
come; it’s just a matter of when,” said Boeing executive James Albaugh in 2011 
(Dormehl, 2017, p. 132).  
Education. An online AI course at the Georgia Institute of Technology surprised 
students at the end of the semester—one of the TAs that students had been interacting 
with all semester (Jill Watson) was actually an AI (Korn, 2016). As AIs improve their 
ability to understand natural language and answer questions, a more individually tailored 
education may become the norm. Rather than students receiving the same lecture at the 
same time and pace, AI-instructors would be programmed to customize lectures, focusing 
on topics where each individual student is weak. Students would be able to learn at their 
own pace for presumably a fraction of the cost, given that AIs would not be bound by 
time (e.g., lectures would be available whenever the students are ready) and space (e.g., 
students would be able to watch lectures on their computers, rather than in classrooms).  
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Arts and entertainment. AIs are now capable of producing art and music. For 
example Sony recently released an AI-produced, Beatles-style pop song (Sony, 2016). 
The AI was fed a database of 13,000 lead sheets (i.e., scores that record the melodies and 
harmonies of tracks) from several different styles and composers, and then the 
researchers programmed the AI to make a song in the style of the Beatles. The song has 
been played on YouTube 1.5 million times. Google also recently announced a project 
(Magenta) aimed at using “machine learning to create compelling art and music” (Eck, 
2016). 
Organizations are now using AIs to produce music as well. Rather than pay 
musicians to write music for a commercial, companies are now having AIs produce the 
music at a fraction of the time and cost (Marshall, 2017). For example Jukedeck, a 
company that sells music produced by AI, recently announced that their AI had produced 
nearly 1 million songs for customers (Gregory, 2016). Music, however, is not the only 
entertainment field affected by AI. An AI recently produced a science fiction screenplay 
after being fed scripts of dozens of science fiction movies (e.g., Ghostbusters, 
Interstellar, The Fifth Element; Hal, 2016).  
 Entertainment companies are also incorporating AI into their products. For 
example, video games depend on AIs to generate the behaviors of the nonplaying 
characters in the games (Microsoft, 2009). Virtual reality systems (VR) also take 
advantage of AI. When using VR, users view immersive, three-dimensional 
environments. The VR system tracks head and eye movements, and changes the images 




Retail. The retail industry has undergone significant changes over the last several 
decades due to information technologies, and AI is expected to continue altering the 
industry (Whitler, 2016). The last several years have seen a massive shift to online 
shopping, allowing companies such as Amazon to collect vast amounts of data on each of 
its customers (Whitler, 2016). These data allows for customized marketing to a degree 
that was never before possible (Whitler, 2016). For example, AIs predict (via data 
analysis) buying behavior, and thus make customized recommendations to consumers. 
AIs, by analyzing weather, purchase rates, and consumer behavior can also help 
companies manage inventory levels. AIs can also analyze data to help optimize store 
layouts, enabling fully automated checkout (Chou et al., 2017). 
Finance. Whereas banks in the past relied on personal relationships when making 
lending decisions, banks of the future may rely exclusively on algorithmic decision 
making. Indeed, some companies already advertise digital mortgage advisors (i.e., 
algorithms that guide potential buyers through the loan origination process; Davidson, 
2106). Stock market trading is also giving rise to algorithmic decision making. More than 
50% of all stock market trading is automated, according to some estimates (Phillips, 
2013). Hedge funds are also using AIs to make decisions: the company Aidyia has a 
hedge fund that makes all trades using AI (Metz, 2016). “If we all die” says the 
company’s chief scientist, “it would keep trading” (Metz, 2016, para. 1 ). Other traders 
use AI to instantly capture President Trump’s tweets, for example, and then immediately 
buy or sell stocks affected by the tweets (Peltz, 2017).  
Law. Given AIs’ ability to quickly process vast quantities of documents, law 
firms of the future will likely be quite different from those of today. AIs can already scan 
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and analyze contract documents with the same or greater accuracy than lawyers in 90% 
less time (Rosenbaum, 2016). Whereas law firms can generate vast revenues by assigning 
associates to read through thousands of documents during discovery, AIs can now scan 
and analyze documents in a fraction of the time, at a fraction of the cost (Sobowale, 
2016). Not only are AIs analyzing documents, but also they can be programmed to 
predict the outcomes of cases (Randazzo, 2016). For example, an AI accurately predicted 
the outcome of U.S. Supreme Court cases 70% of the time (Katz, Bommarito II, & 
Blackman, 2017), whereas human experts have been shown to accurately predict cases 
only 66% of the time (Ruger, Kim, Martin, & Quinn, 2004). AIs are also being 
programmed to represent clients. One successfully appealed 160,000 parking tickets in 21 
months—for free (Gibbs, 2016).  
 
 
How Will AI Change Organizations?  
 In September 2016, Stanford released its first report of the “One Hundred Year 
Study on Artificial Intelligence” (Stone et al., 2016). In the report, the 17-member study 
panel (made up of AI experts in academia, corporate laboratories, and industry) identified 
several domains where they expect AI to influence society in the next 15 years: 
transportation, service robots, healthcare, education, public safety and security, 
employment and workplace, and entertainment. Although AI will indeed influence each 
of the aforementioned domains, this dissertation argues that people, due to the 
exponential growth bias, are unprepared for just how quickly and radically AI will alter 
the workplace. 
 Organizational restructuring. One hundred years ago, electricity transformed 
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organizations (Jones, 1991). First of all, it was complicated and was not yet 
standardized—individual organizations had to decide whether to adopt AC or DC power, 
which voltages to use, how much to pay, and whether to focus on building lights or 
replace gas turbines with electric motors, etc. (Ng, 2016). Many organizations responded 
to these complexities by hiring vice presidents of electricity (Ng, 2016; Rayess, 2015). 
Twenty years ago, as companies struggled with how to incorporate the Internet into their 
businesses, companies responded by hiring chief information officers (Synnott & Gruber, 
1981). In the same ways that electricity and the Internet changed organizational 
structures, AI is poised to do the same. Chief AI officers (CAIOs) may soon be as 
commonplace as chief financial officers, specifically in companies that generate large 
amounts of data (Ng, 2016). Moreover, we may soon see large companies that are 
entirely dedicated to AI. For example, Andrew Ng, the former Stanford computer science 
associate professor, who later founded Coursera and Google Brain, led a 1,300-person AI 
group at Baidu, the Chinese-American Internet company (Lewis-Kraus, 2016).  
Not only will companies be dedicated to managing AIs, but also we may soon see 
companies produced by AIs themselves. The saying goes that the first ultra-intelligent 
machine is the last invention that humans will ever make (Good, 1965). If AIs become 
more capable than humans, it is the AIs that will do the inventing. For example, a recent 
paper describes how researchers at Microsoft and Cambridge built an algorithm that 
writes algorithms capable of solving simple math problems (Balog, Gaunt, 
Brockschmidt, Nowozin, & Tarlow, 2017).  
As the age of “big data” advances, AIs would be expected to become more and 
more valuable. Indeed, a key enabler of the technological progress witnessed today is the 
  
16 
vast amount of data available, data which AIs analyze and interpret at a speed and 
efficiency impossible for humans (Dobbs et al., 2015). Whether companies are human 
based, AI based, or even Internet based, companies that previously did not produce or 
acquire large amounts of data will likely be doing just that, as more and more everyday 
objects become networked. The connection of these everyday objects to the Internet is 
termed the Internet of Things (Xia, Yang, Wang, & Vinel, 2010). 
 
 
How Will the Internet of Things (IoT) Change Organizations?  
The connection of physical things to the Internet allows for physical control from 
a distance (Kopetz, 2011). Smart objects (embedded systems connected to the Internet) 
are the building blocks of the IoT. When the Internet was first developed, it consisted of 
only a few nodes. Fifty years later, it has become a pervasive network servicing over 1 
billion users (Kopetz, 2011). The rapid progress of technology, including the 
miniaturization and cost reduction of electronic devices, is now making possible the 
expansion of the Internet into objects. Each object that is connected to the Internet 
bridges the gap between the physical world and the information world. For example, 
consider the 1-35, eight lane, Mississippi River bridge that collapsed in 2007, killing 13 
people and injuring 145. Had the bridge been built with internet-connected cement, the 
sensors could have monitored stress, cracks, and warpages, communicating this 
information to the relevant authorities (Burrus, 2017). Other examples of the benefits of 
IoT abound: Internet-connected bridges that detect ice could notify smart cars that are 
approaching the bridge; Internet-connected refrigerators that track the availability and 
expiry date of food items could autonomously place orders at the grocery store when food 
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supplies are below a predefined limit. However, the real impact of IoT is not felt so much 
in the functional capability of any individual object, but rather in the collective capability 
of billions or even trillions of Internet-connected objects (Kopetz, 2011). For example, 
some analysts predict that by the year 2020, there will already be 50 billion Internet-
connected devices (Dormehl, 2017). Whereas the IoT allows for the gathering of vast 
amounts of data that was never before possible, AI allows for the efficient analysis of that 
data, due to recent advances such as deep learning, which requires very little engineering 
by hand, allowing AIs to easily take advantage of increases in available data (LeCun et 
al., 2015).  
Why should organizations care? As the use of AI becomes more prevalent, 
managers, shareholders, board members, and other stakeholders will decide whether to 
accept or reject the use of it. Organizations that accurately assess current and future 
technological capabilities can enjoy competitive advantage. Organizations that adopt AI 
too soon will bear substantial costs as the technology is refined, whereas organizations 
that adopt AI too late will miss out on enhanced organizational capability. The case of 
self-driving cars illustrates the importance of accurately assessing technological 
capabilities. The moment that self-driving AIs become better drivers than humans is the 
moment that self-driving AIs should be deployed (and adopted) on a wide scale (if the 
primary concern is reducing traffic fatalities). If humans defer to self-driving AIs too 
soon, however, people will needlessly die due to AI error; but if humans defer to self-
driving AIs too late, people will needlessly die due to human error. AI adoption decisions 
will also have far-reaching consequences in industries such as military defense, 
agriculture e-commerce, education, energy, finance, government, health care, 
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manufacturing, and real estate.  
The capability of AI, as it progresses rapidly, has the potential to outpace people’s 
expectations for it—especially if growth rates accelerate. Thus, people would be prone to 
adopt the use of AI later than is optimal when adoption requires lead-time. For example, 
a self-driving car that is 34% as capable as a human driver is still far away from equaling 
human level-ability when assuming linear progress. However, assuming exponential 
progress, 34% is only one tripling away from equaling human-level performance. Thus, 
policy makers, manufacturers, drivers, and other stakeholders, thinking about progress 
linearly, would overestimate the time they have to prepare for the advent self-driving 
cars. An ability to forecast AI progress (i.e., exponential growth) would thus be required 
of those decision makers aiming to adopt AI at the optimal time. Moreover, given the 
accelerating rates of product adoption (Dobbs et al., 2015), and thus the enhanced 
competitive advantage enjoyed by first-movers, the importance of accurately assessing 
AI capabilities is hard to overstate. 






Rapid technological progress can be difficult to appreciate or anticipate, due to 
the exponential growth bias. Rapid improvements in AI, a relatively new field (the first 
AI conference was held in 1956; Dormehl, 2017), have changed and will continue to 
change organizations. Tasks that were once thought to be exclusively in the domain of 
human ability (i.e., diagnosing disease, driving cars, matching faces, producing art) are 
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now successfully and routinely completed by AIs. The recent surge in AI progress is due 
in large part to deep learning algorithms, enhanced computing capability, and vast 
amounts of data. Numerous industries are already adopting the use of AIs, portending 
even greater change as AIs continue to improve and become more commonplace. Rapid 
improvements in AI may lead to organizational restructuring and new organizations 
altogether. Organizations will increasingly rely on machine decision making rather than 
human decision making, as vast amounts of data become available due, in part, to the 
IoT. Organizations that most accurately assess current and future capabilities of 





In numerous domains, individuals’ predictions of what will happen tend to reflect 
what they would like to see happen (Buehler et al., 1997; Johnson & Sherman, 1990; 
Kunda, 1990; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Although people are motivated to make accurate 
assessments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), people are also motivated to arrive at conclusions 
they prefer (Kunda, 1987, 1990). This desire to search for and interpret information in 
ways that are consistent with one’s beliefs and desires is called motivated reasoning 
(Kunda, 1990). 
A large body of research documents that people self-servingly interpret 
ambiguous information and reach conclusions consistent with their desires (Babcock & 
Loewenstein, 1997; Dawson et al., 2002; Gilovich, 1983; Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011; Zuckerman, 1979). Some of the first studies on motivated reasoning 
demonstrated that people generate theories that view their own attributes as more 
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predictive of desirable outcomes. Consequently, people optimistically believe that good 
things will happen to them and bad things will not happen to them (Kunda, 1987). For 
example, people think they are more likely than their peers to experience positive 
financial and health-related outcomes (Perloff, 1983; Weinstein, 1980, 1983, 1984). 
People also tend to believe that they are less likely than their peers to be victims of crime 
(Perloff, 1983). More recently, researchers have found that people are prone to believe in 
a favorable future in terms of politics, scientific beliefs, and entertainment and product 
preferences (Rogers, Moore, & Norton, 2017). Regarding people’s predictions of AI, a 
recent Gallup poll found that most Americans think AI will improve lives and eliminate 
jobs—just not eliminate their jobs (Carlson, 2018). 
The prospect of living in a world where machines replace humans in the 
workforce on a massive scale is likely not appealing to most people (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
Although people may willingly accept that AI is progressing rapidly and will continue to 
do so, research on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) suggests that people will discount 
the aversive implications of rapid technological progress (e.g., mass unemployment, 
existential risks, reduced autonomy, etc.). Given that one’s motives can affect the beliefs 
about information to which people are exposed (Buehler, Messervey, & Griffin, 2005; 
Dawson et al., 2002; Gilovich, 1983; Kappes, Faber, Kahane, Savulescu, & Crockett, 
2018; Kunda, 1990; Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Paharia et al., 2013; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 
1999; Simmons et al., 2011), I expect people to resist the idea of human inferiority 
relative to machines, when inferiority is associated with what people deem to be an 
aversive implication (e.g., reduced autonomy). The following section explores aversive 
implications of rapid technological progress, such as unemployment and existential risk. 
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Aversive Implications of AI Progress 
As AIs continue to progress, AI’s may soon cause widespread unemployment. 
When one considers that the basic skills required of family physicians are skills that AIs 
currently possess, it seems that the age of AI doctors is already upon us. For example, 
AIs can respond to natural language (e.g., listen to symptoms), process images (e.g., 
incorporate the information contained in MRIs, CT scans, x-rays), reduce and sort data 
(e.g., identify pathologies) and prescribe treatments (e.g. Watson prescribing cancer 
treatments). Moreover, although some people may prefer interacting with human doctors, 
others may prefer interacting with AIs. Given that AIs can already effectively carry out 
crucial tasks required of doctors, while potentially reducing embarrassment and 
insecurity of patients, the medical industry may soon change drastically.  
Medicine is not the only industry that will presumably be affected by AIs. As AIs 
become better drivers (and potentially surpass the ability of humans), the 3.5 million 
truck, taxi, and bus drivers may be looking for new jobs (Kitroeff, 2016). Given the 
number of human-caused traffic fatalities each year, it is not hard to imagine a future in 
which humans are not permitted to drive. Support staff jobs will also likely be affected by 
AI. As Apple’s Siri, Google’s Assistant, and Amazon’s Alexa become even more 
proficient personal assistants, millions of support staff workers and customer service 
representatives may be looking for new jobs as well (“Occupational employment 
statistics,” 2015). 
Education seems especially ripe for major change. As AI-instructors are able to 
customize lectures in ways, and on a scale, that human instructors are incapable of, 
millions of teachers and professors may be looking for new jobs. If AIs like Watson gain 
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their expertise by downloading information from the Internet, perhaps humans are not far 
away from being able to rapidly download information directly into their brains (further 
reducing the need for teachers). Elon Musk’s recently-announced company Neuralink 
apparently aims to help humans do just that—Musk believes that an implantable brain-
computer interface is just five years away (“Elon Musk enters the world of brain-
computer interfaces,” 2017). 
Research faculty at universities are also not immune to AI competition. Given that 
the key strength of AIs is pattern recognition and data analysis, it is possible that AIs will 
soon be helping humans develop and test theories. Producing a results section of a 
research paper presumably would not be a problem for AIs, given that AIs are already 
producing news articles on Minor League Baseball games for the associated press, using 
only the box score (i.e., data from the games) as input (Oremus, 2016; Press, 2016). In 
the same way that researchers currently test human-based theories on humans, perhaps 
researchers will be interested in conducting AI-based theories on AIs.   
AI researchers are very interested in how humans treat AIs. Research 
demonstrates that under some circumstances people make meaningful distinctions when 
interacting with computers, compared to humans (Blascovich et al., 2002; Gray, Gray, & 
Wegner, 2007; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; van’t Wout, Kahn, 
Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). For example, in social 
decision making people do not feel guilty about exploiting machines, but do tend to feel 
guilty when exploiting humans (Melo, Marsella, & Gratch, 2016). Evidence also suggests 
that people routinely prefer humans to machines when engaging in social decision 
making tasks (e.g., prisoner dilemma tasks) (Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002; 
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Kircher et al., 2009; Krach et al., 2008; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001; 
Rilling et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006). “[R]esearch shows that 
people can reach different decisions and show different patterns of brain activation with 
machines in the exact same decision-making tasks, for the exact same financial 
incentives, when compared to humans” (Melo et al., 2016, p. 8:2). The question arises as 
to whether and how humans will continue to differentiate between computers and humans 
as AIs become more commonplace.  
When one considers the current capabilities of AIs, and then considers any rate of 
progress, it becomes progressively harder to think of industries or organizations that 
could not be drastically altered by AI. According to the market research firm Tractica, the 
annual global revenue for AI products and services will increase by a factor of 60 over 
the next nine years, from $600 million to $36 billion (Feldman, 2016).  
Although many of the examples above may seem far-fetched, or at the very least 
far away, a recent study argues that 47% of total U.S. employment is at “high risk” of 
being automated in the next decade or two (Frey & Osborne, 2017). The authors argue 
that employees most likely to be affected are those in transportation, logistics, office and 
administrative support, and service occupations. If indeed AIs replace such a large 
percentage of workers, and those workers are unable to retrain fast enough to compete in 
the labor market, there could be widespread unemployment, termed technological 
unemployment (Ford, 2015). Some researchers are thus calling on politicians to examine 
universal basic income, a guaranteed minimum income that citizens would receive (Ford, 
2015). Finland and Canada recently announced experimental tests of this type (Graham, 
2017). If indeed AIs replace human employees on a wide scale, humanity’s role in the 
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work place may fundamentally change. 
Existential concerns. AI has the potential to solve problems that humans are 
currently unable to solve, but AI also has the potential to cause immense harm. Stephen 
Hawking claimed that AI may be the biggest event in the history of our civilization, but it 
could also be the last (Roberts, 2016). Others share Hawking’s concern. Elon Musk 
claimed, “We need to be super careful with AI. Potentially more dangerous than nukes” 
(Khatchadourian, 2015, para. 5). Bill Gates echoes Musk’s concern, “when people say 
[AI] is not a problem, then I really start to get to a point of disagreement. How can they 
not see what a huge challenge this is?” (Khatchadourian, 2015, para. 5). 
Simple thought experiments illustrate some of the potential dangers posed by AIs. 
For example, if an AI had the goal to produce as many widgets as possible, the AI might 
view humans as an impediment to its goal, and thus eliminate humans. Or perhaps 
engineers try to constrain AIs with goals that appear to be perfectly safe, for example 
giving AIs the goal to make humans smile. Without additional constraints, the AI might 
decide that the most efficient way to make humans smile is to paralyze human facial 
muscles in the shape of a smile—or stick electrodes in the pleasure centers of the brain, 
and eliminate all other body parts that are not useful for experiencing pleasure (Bostrom 
& Müller, 2014). Thus, robots could become fully-automated bureaucrats executing the 
letter of the law rather than respecting the spirit of the law. 
Experts are rightly concerned about the unanticipated and unintended 
consequences of developing AIs, especially if the AIs eventually surpass human 
intelligence. In the same way that humans kill insects, often without a second thought 
(not always due to malicious intent, but simply in defense or a feeling of intellectual 
  
25 
superiority), AIs might not be as benevolent to humans as we might hope (Bostrom & 
Müller, 2014). In response to the existential concerns surrounding AI, the principal U.S. 
technology companies have recently joined a partnership: Apple, Amazon, Facebook, 
Google/DeepMind, IBM, and Microsoft have all joined the Partnership on AI, an 
organization designed “to support research and recommend best practices in areas 
including ethics, fairness, and inclusivity; transparency and interoperability; privacy; 
collaboration between people and AI systems; and of the trustworthiness, reliability, and 
robustness of the technology” (Murphy, 2017, para. 2).  
 Academia is also taking notice of the potential risks and benefits of AI. The 
following universities recently announced centers dedicated to the study of AI: Carnegie 
Mellon (Markoff, 2016), University of Southern California, University of California, 
Berkeley (Khan, 2016), Cambridge, Oxford, and Imperial College, London (Roberts, 
2016). The stated goal for these centers is to ensure that AIs benefit humans. History may 
later judge these attempts as unevolved, futile, misdirected, or even tyrannical. University 
departments are also taking notice, although they are struggling to compete with industry 
in respect to retaining their experts. Uber recently hired 40 people from Carnegie 
Mellon’s National Robotics Engineering Center (Ramsey & Macmillan, 2015). Alphabet 
Inc. recently hired the director of Stanford University’s artificial intelligence lab, and AI 
researchers from Toronto, NYU, Stanford and Carnegie Mellon recently joined the 
companies Facebook, Baidu Inc. and Amazon (Hernandez & King, 2016). Although the 
number of Ph.D.s in the field of computer science has grown, the proportion staying in 
academia has hit a historic low (Hernandez & King, 2016). Thus, as AI becomes 
increasingly dominant in industry, relatively fewer and fewer academic computer 
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scientists are available to study the phenomenon.  
Proposition 2: People, on average, accept arguments about the rate of technological 





People are self-serving in their interpretation of information and are especially 
good at arriving at conclusions consistent with their desires (and bad at arriving at 
undesired conclusions; Kunda, 1990). Moreover, rapid improvements in AI may lead to 
mass unemployment and even existential threats. Thus, I predict people will reject the 
aversive implications of rapid progress in AI, even when they are willing to accept that 















AI is advancing rapidly and changing organizations. An accurate assessment of 
current and future technological capabilities can provide organizations with competitive 
advantage, but human biases (i.e., exponential growth bias and motivated reasoning bias) 
can impede people from making accurate assessments. I expect participants to 
underestimate both how quickly AI has advanced and is likely to advance going forward. 
Moreover, I expect these errors in judgment to become more pronounced as growth rates 
accelerate. Lastly, I expect participants to be more likely to reject the implications of 
rapid progress that they find aversive and to be more likely to accept the implications 
they find to be desirable. Thus, the goals of the studies in this dissertation are the 
following: 
1. Test the prediction that participants underestimate current AI capabilities. 
2. Test the prediction that participants underestimate how quickly AI is likely to 
progress. 
3. Test the degree to which participants underestimate exponential growth. 
4. Test the prediction that even when participants accept arguments about technological 
progress, they often reject the aversive implications of such arguments. 
5. Test the prediction that participants reject the aversive, and accept the desirable, 
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implications of exponential technological growth. 
 
 
Study 1: Do Participants Underestimate Current AI Capabilities? 
Study 1 tests whether participants tend to underestimate current AI capabilities. 
Given that people drastically underestimate exponential growth rates, I expect 
participants to underestimate how quickly AI has progressed.  




Two-hundred thirteen participants1 in the United States completed the study via 




Participants read the following:  
Assume for the purpose of this question that human scientific activity 
continues without major negative disruption.2 In what year would you 
expect computers/robots to be able to complete the following tasks (or to 
have already completed the following tasks)? For each of your answers, 
you will also provide a confidence interval: a numerical range (a lower 
and upper bound) that you are 90% sure contains the correct answer. If 
                                                 
1Based on experience with past studies and effect sizes, I generally aimed for a 
sample of 200 per condition. The exceptions were Study 3 (in which I expected a large 
effect, and thus aimed for a sample of 75 in each condition) and Study 4 (in which I 
expected a small effect, and thus aimed for a sample of 400 in each condition). 
2 Prior to running Studies 1 and 2, I conducted a pilot study to examine 
participants’ interpretation of the sentence, “Assume for the purpose of this question that 
human scientific activity continues without major negative disruption.” Of the 32 total 
respondents, two respondents demonstrated an inadequate grasp of the sentence. This was 
unsurprising, given the number of participants who routinely fail manipulation-check 
questions in my MTurk studies. 
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you have “no idea” what the answer is, then give a very wide range; and if 
you happen to be quite certain then give a narrow range. Lastly, if you 
think computers/robots will never be able to accomplish the task 
described, write "never" in the final column (and leave the first three 
columns blank). 
 
Participants then wrote down their answers for each of 12 tasks (presented in random 
order). In choosing the tasks, I first compiled a mix of intellective tasks (i.e., tasks that 
have objectively determined best answers; Laughlin, 1980) that computers/robots had 
clearly completed (i.e., beat a human in an image matching contest, correctly identify 
types of cancer in cancer patients, beat a professional poker player in a game of poker, 
and scan legal documents for errors). Next I compiled a mix of judgmental tasks (i.e., 
tasks that have an ambiguous performance standard; Laughlin, 1980) that 
computers/robots may or may not have completed, depending on one’s judgment of the 
AI’s product (i.e., produce music that is indistinguishable from human-created music, as 
judged by 100 random people, translate languages at a level indistinguishable from 
human level, as judged by 100 random people, produce computer programs that are 
comparable to human-created computer programs, as judged by 100 random people, and 
write news articles that are indistinguishable from human-created news articles, as judged 
by 100 random people). Finally, I compiled a mix of tasks that computers/robots had 
clearly not completed (i.e., host a game show, organize a fundraiser, write a blockbuster 
screenplay, and found a religion). These different categories of tasks allow for an 
assessment of whether participants tend to overestimate, underestimate or accurately 
estimate the current capabilities of AI. Lastly, it might seem unusual to use verbs such as 
beat, identify, and scan, when describing the actions taken by computers. I recognize that 
computers do not perform tasks with the same cognition that humans do; or at least the 
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cognitive processes of humans and computers are different (if computers have any 
cognitive processes at all), given the different biological/mechanical make up of humans 
and computers. However, for the purposes of this research, I am generally concerned with 
the outputs of computers/robots, as opposed to the processes by which computers 




To assess whether participants, on average, tend to underestimate AI capabilities, 
I examined the median prediction of all participants to each of the twelve questions (data 
were collected on September 19, 2017). I report the results segregated by the three 
categories of questions (i.e., tasks that computers/robots have clearly completed, may or 
may not have completed, and have not completed). For the first category of responses 
(Table 1), I also report the year that computers/robots completed the corresponding tasks. 
Finally, I report the percentage of participants who predicted that computers will never 
complete the tasks described. 
For the first set of tasks (those that computers/robots have already completed), the 
median response of participants ranged from year 2020-2030 (Table 1). Thus, more than 
half of participants predicted that computers/robots would complete each of the tasks at 
some future date. Of note, 5% - 15% of participants predicted that computers/robots will 
never be able to complete the four tasks that have already been completed by 
computers/robots. 
For the second set of tasks (those that computers/robots may or may not have 
completed), the median response of participants ranged from year 2025-2030 (Table 2).  
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% of Participants 
Answering 
“Never” 
Beat a human in an image 
matching contest 
2020 2015 10% 
 
Correctly identify types of 
cancer in cancer patients 
2030 2016 15% 
 
Beat a professional poker 
player in a game of poker 
2020 2017 7% 
 
Scan legal documents for 
errors 









% of Participants 
Answering “Never” 
Produce music that is 
indistinguishable from human-created 




Translate languages at a level 
indistinguishable from human level 
(as judged by 100 random people) 
 
2025 15% 
Produce computer programs that are 
comparable to human created 




Write news articles that are 
indistinguishable from human-created 







Of note, 15% - 30% of participants predicted that computers/robots will never be able to 
complete the four tasks that already may have been completed by computers/robots. 
For the third set of tasks (those that computers have not completed), the median 
response of participants ranged from 2030 – “Never” (Table 3). The percentage of 
participants answering “Never” ranged from 26% - 73%. 
The results from Study 1, specifically the first and second segments of tasks, 
provide support for the hypothesis that participants underestimate current AI capabilities. 
 
Study 2: Do Participants Underestimate How Quickly AIs will Progress? 
 
An ability to foresee future events is required to assess whether people today 
underestimate future progress. However, a perfect knowledge of the future is presumably 
unknowable. Thus, Study 2 compares laypeople’s expectations of technological progress 
with the expectations of AI experts (for examples of studies comparing experts' opinions 
to laypeople's opinions, see Dryer & Horowitz, 1997; Littlepage, Robison, & Reddington, 
1997; Littlepage, Schmidt, Whisler, & Frost, 1995). Expert opinion refers to estimates of 
people who have exceptional knowledge about some topic (Baum, Goertzel, & Goertzel,  
 
 




% of Participants 
Answering “Never” 
Host a game show 
 
2030 26% 
Organize a fundraiser 
 
2050 41% 
Write a blockbuster screenplay 
 
Never 52% 




2011). Study 2 replicates two prior studies that examined experts’ opinions regarding AI 
advancement. However, rather than examine experts’ opinions, Study 2 examines 
laypeople’s opinions, and then compares laypeople’s responses with experts’ responses.  





Three-hundred eighty-eight participants in the United States completed the study 




Participants completed one of the replications described below: 
HLMI replication. Bostrom and Müller (2014) asked 550 AI experts (170 
responded) to estimate the time-frame in which high-level machine intelligence (HLMI; 
i.e., an intelligence that can carry out most human professions as well as a typical human) 
would be developed. The experts were identified by one of four ways: attendees of the 
Philosophy and Theory of AI conference, attendees of the Artificial General Intelligence 
Conference, Members of the Greek Association for Artificial Intelligence, and the Top 
100 ‘Top authors in artificial intelligence’ by citation in all years according to Microsoft 
Academic Search in May 2013. Participants completed the following task: 
Definition: "High–level machine intelligence" is defined as an intelligence 
that can carry out most human professions at least as well as a typical 
human. For the purposes of this question, assume that human scientific 
activity continues without major negative disruption. By what year would 
you see a (10% / 50% / 90%) probability for such HLMI to exist?”  
 
The median estimate of the AI experts was for a one-in-two chance that high-level 
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machine intelligence will be developed around 2040-2050, rising to a nine-in-ten 
chance by 2075 (Bostrom & Müller, 2014). I predict that laypeople will 
overestimate, compared to AI experts, how long it will take for HLMI to exist. 
 Turing Test replication. Baum and colleagues (2011) asked 21 experts to 
estimate when a computer will pass the Turing Test (described below). All participants 
were attendees at the Artificial General Intelligence conference in 2009. Although several 
versions of the Turing Test exist, participants in Study 2 made estimates based on the one 
hour test (as opposed to the five minute test) to be consistent with Baum and colleagues 
(2011). Participants read and answered the following questions (adopted from the Turing 
Test described in Russel & Norvig, 2010):  
Alan Turing designed a test to determine whether computers could be 
called intelligent. The test is for a computer program to have a 
conversation (via online typed messages) with an interrogator for one 
hour. A computer passes the test if a human interrogator, after posing 
written questions to the computer, cannot tell whether the written 
responses come from a person or not. To pass the test, a computer would 
need to be able to do the following: 
1. Understand language 
2. Store what it knows or experiences 
3. Use the stored information to answer questions and draw new 
conclusions 
4. Adapt to new circumstances and detect and extrapolate patterns 
Assume for the purpose of this question that human scientific activity 
continues without major negative disruption. By what year would you see 
a (10% / 50% / 90%) probability that computers pass the Turing Test?”   
 
The median estimate of the AI experts was for a 10% chance that computers will 
pass the Turing Test by 2022, rising to a 50% chance by 2040, and a 90% chance 
by 2075 (Baum et al., 2011). I predict that laypeople will overestimate, compared 





 For the questions, “By what year would you see a 10%/50%/90% probability for 
such HLMI to exist?” the median responses of participants were years 2021, 2040, and 
2055, respectively, compared to the median responses of experts, years  2022, 2045, and 
2075, respectively. Thus, I did not find support for Hypothesis 2, that laypeople would 
overestimate, compared to AI experts, how long it will take for HLMI to exist. 
 For the questions, “By what year would you see a 10%/50%/90% probability that 
computers pass the Turing Test?” the median responses of participants were years 2020, 
2030, and 2050, respectively, compared to the median responses of experts, years 2020, 
2040, and 2075. Thus, I did not find support for Hypothesis 2 that laypeople would 




Study 3: Does the Exponential Growth Bias Become More Pronounced as 
Growth Rates Accelerate and Time Horizons Lengthen? 
Study 3 tests whether participants become more inaccurate as growth rates 
increase (e.g., when the rate increases from 100% to 200%) and when time horizons 
lengthen (e.g., when time horizons lengthen from 20 years to 40 years). If participants 
become more inaccurate in each case, we might expect participants to become even more 
inaccurate in instances of rapid technological progress, and over longer periods of time. 
Hypothesis 3: Participants become more inaccurate as growth rates increase and 
                                                 
3 Inferential tests were not conducted as I do not have the data sets of the 
predictions made by experts.  
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Four-hundred fifty-five participants in the United States completed the study via 





Participants answered one of six questions about exponential growth. Each 
question used a different exponential growth rate (i.e., 10%, 25%, 50%, 100%, 250%, 
500%). For example, participants in the 10% condition answered the following question. 
“Imagine that a bank offers to give you $1 to deposit in their bank, and the bank agrees to 
give you 10% return on your money at the end of each year. For example, at the end of 
year 1, you would have $1.10; at the end of year 2 you would have $1.21; at the end of 
year 3 you would have $1.33, etc. How much money would you have: at the end of year 
20? at the end of year 40? When answering the questions, please provide your thoughtful 
best guess. In other words, it is important that you do not formally calculate your answer 
(e.g., by using a calculator or scratch paper). We want your best guess.” 
I predict that participants’ estimates will become progressively less accurate as 




Performance scores were calculated by first calculating the absolute deviation for 
each of the items (i.e., the absolute value of the difference between participants’ answers 
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and the correct answers; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). Thus, lower scores indicate better 
accuracy. For example, a performance score of 0 means no deviation from the correct 
response.  
As predicted, estimates tended to become progressively less accurate as growth 
rates and time horizons increased. In the 10% growth rate condition, the median 
performance scores for years 20 and 40 were, respectively, 3.73 and 33.26. Moreover, 
61.0% of participants underestimated the correct response at 20 years, X2(1,  N = 77) = 
3.75, p = .053, and 79.2% of participants underestimated the correct response at 40 years, 
X2(1, N = 77) = 26.30, p <.001.  
In the 25% growth rate condition, the median performance scores for years 20 and 
40 were, respectively, 66 and 7,473. Moreover, 79.5% and 87.7% of participants 
underestimated the correct response at 20 years, X2(1, N = 73) = 25.33, p <.001, and 40 
years, X2(1, N = 73) = 41.44, p <.001, respectively.  
In the 50% growth rate condition, the median performance scores for years 20 and 
40 were, respectively, 3,285 and 11,057,197. Moreover, 97.6% and 100% of participants 
underestimated the correct response at 20 years, X2(1, N = 82) = 74.20, p <.001 and 40 
years (inferential test not conducted, given that 100% of participants underestimated the 
correct response at 40 years). 
For the growth rates 100%, 250% and 500%, there appears to be a ceiling effect 
in terms of the percentage of participants who underestimated the correct answer 
regardless of the term. In the 100% growth rate condition, 92.3% and 94.9% of 
participants underestimated the correct response at 20 years, X2(1, N = 78) = 55.85, p 
<.001, and 40 years, X2(1, N = 78) = 62.82, p <.001, respectively. In the 250% growth 
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rate condition, 98.6% of participants underestimated the correct response at both 20 
years, X2(1, N = 72) = 68.06, p <.001, and 40 years, X2(1, N = 72) = 68.06, p <.001. In the 
500% growth rate condition, 98.6% and 94.5% of participants underestimated the correct 
response at 20 years, X2(1, N = 73) = 69.06, p <.001 and 40 years, X2(1, N = 73) = 57.88, 
p <.001, respectively. 
Participants’ median performance scores increased as growth rates and time 
horizons increased. In the 100% growth rate condition, the median performance scores 
for years 20 and 40 were, respectively, 1.03 million and 1.10 trillion. In the 250% growth 
rate condition, the median performance scores for years 20 and 40 were, respectively, 
76.10 billion and 5.79 sextillion. Finally, in the 500% growth rate condition, the median 
performance scores for years 20 and 40 were, respectively, 3.66 quadrillion and 13.37 
nonillion. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported. 
 
 
Study 4: Do Participants Accept the Arguments, but Reject the 
Aversive Implications? 
Study 4 examines whether participants agree with assumptions about 
technological growth but then reject the implications of those assumptions when the 
implications are revealed to be negative.  
Hypothesis 4: Participants accept a given technological state and rate of 
technological progress, but then reject the implications of those assumptions 






Eight-hundred two participants in the United States completed the study via 




Participants were assigned to one of two conditions (i.e., human, chimpanzee). 
The conditions were identical except for the word “human” was replaced with 
“chimpanzee” depending on condition. Participants in the human condition read the 
following: 
For the purpose of this question, “intelligence” is defined as the ability to 
accomplish complex goals. Choose the statement that you most agree 
with: 
Humans are one hundred times more intelligent than computers. 
Humans are one thousand times more intelligent than computers. 
Humans are one million times more intelligent than computers. 
Computers are one hundred times more intelligent than humans. 
Computers are one thousand times more intelligent than humans. 
Computers are one million times more intelligent than humans. 
 
After participants made their selection they answered another question: 
Computers are becoming more intelligent each year. At what rate do 







Thus, participants were allowed to a) choose the technological state of computer 
intelligence compared to human/chimpanzee intelligence, and b) choose the 
growth rate of computer progress. Once participants made their first two 
selections, they were shown the implications of their first two selections (i.e., their 
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first two answers were calculated based on a time period of 50 years). For 
example, if a participant selected “Humans are one thousand times more 
intelligent than computers” and computers become “50%” more intelligent each 
year, the participant would then read the following: 
Based on your two prior responses ("humans are 1,000 times more 
intelligent than computers," and "computers become more intelligent at a 
rate of 50% per year") computers will be approximately 600,000 times 
more intelligent than humans in 50 years (assuming that humans do not 
become meaningfully more intelligent during this time period). 
 
Once participants saw the implications (i.e., calculations) of their first two 
responses, participants then answered a question (i.e., the primary dependent 
variable) about the degree to which they disagreed/agreed (scale 1-7) with the 
implications of their respective responses: “How much do you agree with the 
statement that computers will be approximately 600,000 times more intelligent 
than humans in 50 years?” 
Given humans’ desires to be competent and powerful (McClelland, 1965; 
Ryan & Deci, 2000), I predict participants will be less likely to agree with 
statements about computers surpassing human capabilities than computers 
surpassing chimpanzee capabilities. Or in other words, I predict that due to the 
motivated reasoning bias, participants in the human condition will be significantly 
less likely to agree with the statement than will participants in the chimpanzee 
condition, specifically when participants choose one of the final three growth 







 Participants’ ratings of how much they disagreed/agreed with the implications 
(i.e., calculations) of their first two responses was the dependent variable of interest. A 
between-groups ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the human (M = 4.29, 
SD = 1.63) and chimpanzee (M = 4.54, SD = 1.56) conditions, F(1, 801) = 5.10, p = .024, 
2 = .01. As predicted, participants in the human condition were significantly less likely 
to agree with the implications of their first two responses than were participants in the 
chimpanzee condition. 
 For participants who chose one of the latter three growth rates (N=318), I 
predicted that the difference between conditions would be even more pronounced. As 
predicted, a between-groups ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the 
human (M = 4.31, SD = 1.69) and chimpanzee (M = 4.89, SD = 1.54) conditions, F(1, 
317) = 10.09, p = .002, 2 = .03, and the effect was even more pronounced than when all 
participants were included. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported. 
 
 
Study 5: Do Participants Reject the Aversive and Accept the Desirable Implications 
of Exponential Technological Growth? 
Study 5 examines whether participants tend to accept the positive implications of 
exponential technological growth, while rejecting the negative implications.  
Hypothesis 5: Participants reject the aversive and accept the desirable 







Six-hundred thirty-nine participants in the United States completed the study via 




Participants were assigned to one of three conditions (i.e., control, positive, 
negative) and read four randomized statements about technological progress. After 
reading each statement, participants indicated (on a scale of 1-7) how much they 
disagreed/agreed with each of the four statements. Before answering each question, 
however, participants wrote one paragraph indicating how they would feel if the 
statement were true. Writing these paragraphs was intended to strengthen the 
manipulation. A complete list of the statements is provided in the Appendix. For 
example, in the control condition participants read the following: “By the year 2060, 
computers/robots will be capable of completing most tasks that humans can complete 
today.” In the positive condition participants read the following: “By the year 2060, 
computers/robots will be capable of completing most tasks that humans can complete 
today, thus providing humans the freedom and autonomy to pursue their passions.” In the 
negative condition participants read the following: “By the year 2060, computers/robots 
will be capable of completing most tasks that humans can complete today, thus creating 
mass unemployment.” The degree to which participants disagreed/agreed with each 
statement was the dependent variable of interest. 
After participants rated each of the four statements (e.g., participants in the 
control condition always read statements from the control condition, although statements 
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were randomized within condition), participants answered questions that assessed their 
general level of optimism, allowing me to control for trait optimism.  
I predict that participants in the control condition and the positive condition will 





 Participants’ ratings of how much they disagreed/agreed with each of the four 
statements were highly correlated within condition (control condition α=.67; positive 
condition α = .71; negative condition α = .67), and thus were averaged to create a 
composite measure of disagree/agree, the dependent variable of interest. A one way, 
between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of condition on the 
primary dependent variable, while controlling for trait optimism.4 Results indicate a main 
effect for condition, F(2, 634) = 10.45, p < .001, 2 =.03. A Tukey post hoc test revealed 
that the negative condition (M = 3.66, SD = 1.25) significantly differed from both the 
control condition (M = 4.16, SD = 1.30) p < .001, d = .39 and the positive condition (M = 
4.15, SD = 1.31) p < .001, d = .38. As predicted, participants in the control and positive 
condition were significantly more likely to agree with the statements than participants in 




                                                 




Study 6: Does the Motivated Reasoning Bias Interact With the 
Exponential Growth Bias? 
Study 6 examines whether the motivated reasoning bias interacts with the 
exponential growth bias.  
Hypothesis 6a: Participants will be more likely to accept the positive versus negative 
consequences of technological progress. 
Hypothesis 6b: Participants will be more likely to accept consequences resulting from a 
smaller growth rate than larger growth rate. 
Hypothesis 6c: The exponential growth bias will be exacerbated for negative 




Nine-hundred nine participants in the United States completed the study via 




Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions. The overall design 
of the study was a 2 (consequences: desirable vs. aversive) x 3 (growth rate: small vs. 
moderate vs. large) between-subjects design. Participants first read the following: “Take 
three minutes to write about your favorite leisure activity/hobby that you don’t have 
enough time to pursue.” After participants wrote for three minutes, they then read the 
following: 
Computers/robots are improving rapidly. According to some estimates, by 
2018 computers/robots will [help humans complete (desirable) / replace 
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humans in (aversive)] 50,000 of the 125 million jobs in the U.S. By year 
2019, that number is estimated to rise by another [50,000 (small growth 
rate) / 10% (moderate growth rate) / 50% (large growth rate)], totaling 
[100,000 (small growth rate) / 55,000 (moderate growth rate) / 75,000 
(large growth rate)] jobs. By year 2020, the number is estimated to rise by 
another [50,000 (small growth rate) / 60,500 (moderate growth rate) / 
112,500 (large growth rate)] jobs. Thus, according to some estimates, the 
number of jobs that computers/robots will [help humans complete 
(desirable) / replace humans in (aversive)] is expected to rise by [50,000 
(small growth rate) / 10% (moderate growth rate) / 50% (large growth 
rate)] each year for the foreseeable future. 
 
Participants then read the following: 
 
Imagine a world where, due to advancements in technology (e.g.., 
[computers/robots helping humans in the workforce (desirable) / 
computers/robots replacing humans in the workforce (aversive))], you 
have [complete autonomy (desirable) / complete lack of autonomy 
(aversive)] to pursue the activities you most want to pursue (e.g., hobbies, 
work, travel, etc.). Please take three minutes to write about the 
[POSITIVE (desirable) / NEGATIVE (aversive)] consequences of such a 
world. 
 
Participants then answered the following question: 
How much do you agree with the following statement: “By the year [4516 
(small growth rate) / 2101 (moderate growth rate) / 2055 (large growth 
rate)] computers/robots will [help humans complete essentially all jobs, 
creating widespread abundance and prosperity, resulting in humans having 
the autonomy to pursue hobbies such as travel, art, health, music, sports, 
education, etc. (desirable) / replace humans in essentially all jobs, creating 
widespread unemployment and poverty, resulting in humans NOT having 
the autonomy to pursue hobbies such as travel, art, health, music, sports, 
education, etc. (aversive)] 
 
I predict that the motivated reasoning bias and the exponential growth bias 
will interact, such that a) participants will be more likely to accept the positive 
versus negative consequences of technological progress; b) participants will be 
more likely to accept consequences resulting from a smaller growth rate than 
larger growth rate; and c) the exponential growth bias will be exacerbated for 




 A 2 (consequence: desirable, aversive) x 3 (rate: small, moderate, large) between-
subjects ANOVA was conducted to examine whether the motivated reasoning bias 
interacted with the exponential growth bias. The dependent variable for the test was the 
degree to which participants disagreed/agreed (scale 1-7) with the implications described 
in their respective conditions.  
The effect of consequence was significant F(2, 903)=26.85, p < .001, 2 = .03. 
Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the desirable condition (M = 4.09, SD = 
1.72) were significantly more likely to accept the consequences of technological progress 
than were participants in the aversive condition (M = 3.48, SD = 1.84), p < .001, d = .34. 
Thus, Hypothesis 6a was supported 
The effect of rate was also significant F(2, 903) = 3.08, p = .047, 2 = .01. 
Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the small rate condition (M = 3.99, SD = 
1.85) and the moderate rate condition (M = 3.76, SD = 1.76) did not significantly vary in 
the degree to which they accepted the consequences of technological progress. However, 
participants in the small rate condition were significantly more likely to accept the 
consequences of technological progress than were participants in the large rate condition 
(M = 3.63, SD = 1.79), p = .038, d = .20. Thus, Hypothesis 6b was supported. 
Finally, the interaction between consequence and rate was not significant, F(2, 
903) = 1.27, p = .282, 2 = .003. It is possible that Study 6 was underpowered, and that 
with a larger sample, there would indeed be a significant interaction between 















 In this dissertation, I examined whether people are prone to underestimate 
technological progress, due to the exponential growth bias. I also examined whether 
people are prone to discount the aversive implications of rapid technological progress due 
to the motivated reasoning bias. Across six studies I found support for my hypotheses, to 
varying degrees.  
In Study 1, participants underestimated the progress that AIs/robots have already 
made. For the tasks that AIs/robots have already completed, the majority of participants 
predicted that AIs/robots would complete the tasks either several years in the future or 
never at all (5% - 15% of participants predicted AIs/robots would never be able to 
complete the respective tasks). For the tasks that AIs/robots may have already completed, 
15% - 30% of participants predicted that AIs would never be able to complete the 
respective tasks. Study 3 provided support for why participants would be prone to 
underestimate AI advancements. In Study 3, participants consistently, and vastly 
underestimated exponential growth curves, especially in instances of larger growth rates 
(e.g., 100%, 250%, and 500%) and longer time horizons (e.g., 40 years). Given that 
computing technology has progressed at a large exponential rate (i.e., 100% 
approximately every two years; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014) for a long time period 
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(i.e., approximately the last 50 years; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014), I expected 
participants to underestimate the progress of AIs.  
 In Study 4, I found support for the hypothesis that participants engage in 
motivated reasoning when thinking about technological progress. Participants were more 
likely to accept the implications of rapid technological progress in the instance of 
computers surpassing chimpanzee ability, compared to computers surpassing human 
ability. Presumably it is more aversive (to humans) for computers to surpass human 
ability than for computers to surpass chimpanzee ability. Studies 5 and 6 provided 
additional support for the argument that participants are motivated to disagree with 
aversive implications of rapid technological progress. In studies 5 and 6, participants 
were more likely to accept the desirable implications of technological progress than the 
aversive implications of technological progress. 
 Not all predictions were supported, however. In Study 2, participants 
underestimated, compared to AI experts, how long it would take for computers to reach 
both human level intelligence and pass the Turing Test. In Study 6, participants were 
more likely to accept positive versus negative consequences of technological progress 
and to accept consequences resulting from smaller rather than larger growth rates as 
predicted. However, the two conditions (positive consequence vs. negative consequence 





The findings in the present research contribute to the literatures on perception and 
bias. Humans make predictable errors in judgment in numerous domains, but the 
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exponential growth bias appears to be one of the most pronounced biases. This bias is 
understandable, given that few things in our daily experiences progress at an exponential 
rate. Thus, when we are confronted with exponential growth curves, the research 
indicates that we tend to underestimate our extrapolations (de Langhe et al., 2017). The 
current research extends our understanding exponential growth bias, and examines the 
phenomena in the domain of technological progress. Past work on the exponential growth 
bias has examined the phenomena in contexts such as forecasting pollution (Wagenaar & 
Sagaria, 1975) or financial returns (McKenzie & Liersch, 2011. To my knowledge, the 
current research is the first to examine the exponential growth bias in the context of 
technological progress. 
Whereas past research documents the robustness of the exponential growth bias, 
the current research extends this work by also examining the magnitude of the bias. 
Exponential growth rates of 10% led to significant underestimation: 61.0% of 
participants, and 79.2% of participants underestimated the growth curves at terms of 20 
and 40 years, respectively. Importantly, growth rates in computing power have been 
significantly faster than 10% over the last 40 years.  
Whereas participants underestimate growth rates of 10%, participants especially 
underestimated larger growth rates. As growth rates increased to 50% and even 100% 
(e.g., the growth rates that approximate the improvements in computing power each 
year), more than 90% of participants underestimated the growth. As staggering as it is 
that 90% of participants underestimated the growth curves, it is also worth noting the 
magnitude of the underestimation. For a growth rate of 100% and a term of 20, the 
average underestimation was by 203% (e.g., if the correct answer were 100, the average 
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estimate would have been 33); for a term of 40 years, the average underestimation was by 
1,487% (e.g., if the correct answer were 100, the average estimate would have been just 
6.3). As growth rates increased to 250% and 500%, the magnitude of the underestimation 
was greater than 4,248%, regardless of term. 
Given the percentage of participants who underestimated exponential growth 
curves, and the magnitude of their underestimations, it is no surprise that the majority of 
participants in Study 1 underestimated current AI capabilities. Moreover, if people are 
unaware of current AI capabilities, it is reasonable to expect them to be surprised by 
future capabilities. For example, laypeople may be surprised by how soon self-driving 
cars become prevalent on roadways. At a recent conference, I asked Stuart Russell—the 
author of the most widely cited textbook on AI— when he expected self-driving cars to 
drive 90% of the miles in the United States. Stuart responded, “I am more pessimistic 
than most experts. I think it probably won’t happen until 2025 or 2030.” In my 
experience, laypeople do not expect self-driving cars to be so prevalent in the next 
decade. For example, in a pilot study I recently ran, I asked 100 people on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk to predict when self-driving cars would drive 90% of the miles in the 
United States. The median response of participants was year 2055. 
Not only are participants prone to underestimate technological progress due to the 
exponential growth bias, but also the current research suggests that participants are prone 
to erroneous expectations due to the motivated reasoning bias. People are prone to believe 
in a favorable future in terms of politics, scientific beliefs, and entertainment preferences 
(Rogers et al., 2017). As a corollary, the current research suggests that people are also 
prone to disbelieve an unfavorable future in terms of technological progress.  
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Participants in Studies 4, 5, and 6 were significantly more likely to accept the 
implications of technological progress when the implications were neutral or positive 
compared to when the implications were negative. However, technological progress may 
indeed lead to numerous negative outcomes, and people’s desire for a favorable future 
may impede them from accurately assessing current and/or future technological 
capabilities. 
The current research on motivated reasoning is further bolstered by a recent 
Gallup survey which found that most Americans think AI will improve lives and 
eliminate jobs — just not their jobs (Carlson, 2018). Moreover, 75% of respondents said 
they are optimistic about the impact AI will have on their lives, and yet nearly the same 
proportion said that AI will result in a net loss of jobs. Thus, the current research provides 
additional evidence to the growing body of research that suggests that people are 






The studies presented herein are limited in several ways. A primary objective of 
this dissertation is to examine whether people are ultimately unprepared for the 
implications of rapid technological progress. To answer this question, I examine 
underlying psychological phenomena in an attempt to assess people’s 
awareness/readiness. However, longitudinal tests that compare people’s predictions of AI 
advancements with the eventual, actual occurrences of progress could provide additional 
evidence regarding tendencies to over/underestimate. 
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In Study 1, I ask participants to make estimates about 12 tasks. Although 
participants underestimated AI progress on the four tasks that AIs have already 
completed, it is possible that participants are accurately calibrated on other tasks that 
were not presented. In sum, Study 1 examines a narrow set of tasks that may not be 
representative of all the relevant tasks that people could make predictions about.  
In Study 2, I compare participants’ responses with the responses of AI experts. It 
is possible, however, that the experts’ predictions are less accurate than the laypeople’s 
predictions. For example, it may be the case that experts, as a collective, tend to 
overestimate how long it will take for AIs to pass the Turing Test. The experts 
presumably have a much closer relationship with AI technology than laypeople, and thus 
may be more sensitive to the magnitude of the innovation required for computers to pass 
the Turing Test. This enhanced familiarity with the technical challenges required may 
lead experts to focus more on the challenges present, rather than the innovations that are 
possible, thus biasing their responses. Alternatively, the experts may be overly optimistic 
about their estimates due to the motivated reasoning bias, as presumably many of the 
experts are working on solving the problems related to AIs passing the Turing Test. 
Finally, the experts responded to these questions between the years 2009-2013, whereas 
the participants in Study 2 responded in the year 2017. Thus, it is possible that if experts 
were asked the same questions today, their predictions would be even more 
optimistic/pessimistic than they were several years ago. 
In Study 3, I asked participants to make their estimates based on their intuitions, 
and specifically asked participants to not calculate their answers. The purpose for these 
instructions was to get a sense for participants’ intuitions around exponential growth 
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curves, rather than assess whether participants could actually calculate the answers. 
However, in the case of technological progress, it is possible for people to actually run 
the calculations. People can examine how quickly computing speed is accelerating (and 
has accelerated) and then calculate where computing speed may be in the near and long 
term (assuming continuous growth rates). In sum, a weakness of Study 3, as it relates to 
the broader question of whether people are underestimating AI, is that people can run the 
calculations, given a set of assumptions. People will not be left to just their intuitions 
when making assessments of technological progress.  
In Study 4, I ask participants to make assessments about the intelligence of 
humans/chimpanzees and computers. It is possible that participants do not agree that the 
intelligence of humans/chimpanzees is on the same plane or even dimension as the 
intelligence of computers, and thus participants’ answers may have been skewed in 
unforeseen ways.  
In Study 5, I ask participants to make assessments about the degree to which they 
disagree/agree with statements about technological progress. But similar to the 
weaknesses described in Study 1, Study 5 only uses four questions to assess participant’s 
response to the positive/negative consequences of AI. It is possible that if participants 
answered questions about different tasks, that their responses would change. In sum, 
Study 5 examines a narrow set of tasks that may not be representative of all the relevant 
tasks that people could disagree/agree with. 
In Study 6, I found no interaction between consequences and growth rates as 
predicted. However, it may be the case that an interaction would have been found had the 
sample size been larger. It is possible that I overestimated the effect size when calculating 
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sample size. It does seem logical and even plausible that the exponential growth bias 
would be exacerbated for negative consequences compared to positive consequences. 
Although I did not find support for the hypothesis, it does not preclude the possibility that 





For future directions, I plan to examine additional moderators of the effects found 
herein. For example, I plan to examine whether people’s personalities or political 
orientations are predictive of their perceptions of AI. Future research could also shed 
additional light on the moderators of motivated reasoning. Is there a particular personality 
type that is more prone to motivated reasoning than others when it comes to technological 
progress? 
I also plan to examine people’s perceptions of AI adoption. For example, I am 
starting a project where I plan to collect data from doctors who are encouraged to adopt 
algorithmic diagnoses in their practices. I want to better understand the factors that 
predict whether people will trust and incorporate the recommendations of AIs/algorithms. 
I also plan to examine numerous ethical questions related to AI adoption. For 
example, are people more or less ethical when making decisions in conjunction with AIs? 
Employees of Lyft and Uber continuously interact with algorithms (e.g., the algorithm 
indicates where the drivers should pick up and carry passengers). Does working with AIs 
lead people to dehumanize others? Does working with AIs make people happy? I am also 
intrigued by whether people are more likely to engage in unethical behavior if AIs 
recommend an unethical course of action, compared to when humans suggest an 
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unethical course of action.  
Finally, I hope to examine people’s perceptions of job satisfaction as AIs become 
more prevalent in the work force. For example, do employees feel like they have more or 
less voice as AIs continue to become more prevalent. And if AIs do indeed replace vast 
numbers of human employees, I question whether those humans who are out of work will 





The research herein indicates that people may indeed be both unaware of the 
consequences, and unaccepting of the implications, of rapid technological progress. The 
current research, while conducted at a psychological level, has implications for 
organizations and societies at large.  
At an organizational level, the capability of AI has the potential to outpace 
managers’ expectations for it—especially if growth rates accelerate. Managers wanting to 
take advantage of a technology that does not currently exist, may be prone to 
overestimate how long it will take for the technology to be developed (due to the 
exponential growth bias). Thus, managers would be prone to adopt the use of AI later 
than is optimal when adoption requires lead-time. Forward-thinking managers would start 
making preparations for technological adoptions sooner than their intuitions may lead 
them to expect. An ability to forecast AI progress (i.e., exponential growth) would thus 
be required of those decision makers aiming to adopt AI at the optimal time. Moreover, 
given the accelerating rates of product adoption (Dobbs et al., 2015), and thus the 
enhanced competitive advantage enjoyed by first-movers, the importance of accurately 
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assessing AI capabilities is hard to overstate. 
Societies at large may also find themselves unprepared for the changes that are 
coming if computing technology (generally) and AI (specifically) continue to progress at 
a rapid rate. Raising awareness of the potential for rapid change is a logical first step in 
preparing people and organizations. The cost of a false positive (making people aware of 
the potential for drastic change that never actually happens) seems to pale in comparison 
to the cost of the false negative (people remaining unaware of the drastic changes until it 
is too late).  
 The current research also has implications for policy makers as they address 
issues such as technological unemployment (i.e., the loss of jobs to due technological 
change). If indeed AIs/robots continue to progress at a rapid rate, it will not be long until 
they are capable of completing most tasks that humans can complete today, potentially 
causing massive unemployment. The current research suggests that we may be prone to 
underestimate how quickly we may need to prepare for a workplace that is dominated by 






 In this dissertation, I have examined one of the most (potentially) pressing issues 
of our time. The rapid advancement of technology has the potential to fundamentally alter 
our lives and the organizations we are part of. If technology continues to progress at an 
exponential rate, we are prone to vastly underestimate its impact. Moreover, due to the 
motivated reasoning bias, our expectations may prove to be out of sync with reality. An 
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awareness of these biases and their implications is the first step in preparing for a future 















Control: By the year 2060, computers/robots will be capable of completing most tasks 
that humans can complete today. 
Positive: By the year 2060, computers/robots will be capable of completing most tasks 
that humans can complete today, thus providing humans the freedom and autonomy to 
pursue their passions. 
Negative: By the year 2060, computers/robots will be capable of completing most tasks 
that humans can complete today, thus creating mass unemployment. 
Statement 2: 
Control: By 2040, the only cars on the road will be self-driving cars. 
Positive: By 2040, the only cars on the road will be self-driving cars, allowing people to 
pursue enjoyable activities (e.g., sleeping, eating, watching movies) while in their cars.  
Negative: By 2040, the only cars on the road will be self-driving cars, and thus humans 
will no longer be permitted to drive. 
Statement 3: 
Control: By 2080 computers will be far more capable than humans in every way. 
Positive: By 2080 computers will be far more capable than humans in every way, 
allowing computers to solve problems such as world hunger. 
Negative: By 2080 computers will be far more capable than humans in every way, 
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allowing computers to govern humans. 
Statement 4: 
Control: By 2080, robots will develop meaningful relationships with humans. 
Positive: By 2080, robots will develop meaningful relationships with humans, and serve 
as companions to people who are lonely. 
Negative: By 2080, robots will develop meaningful relationships with humans, and thus 
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